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Introduction
The U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division is currently reviewing nearly
1,300 legacy antitrust judgments to determine which ones should be terminated.1
Most of these judgments were entered before 1979, when the Division began using
sunset provisions that automatically terminate these judgments, usually 10 years
after their entry.2 Many of these legacy judgments, the DOJ believes, no longer serve
their original purpose of protecting competition.3 Besides terminating old decrees, the
DOJ recently has clamped down on behavioral remedies and regulatory decrees.4
To be sure, many old consent decrees no longer serve any purpose and deserve to be
terminated. Some involve companies or even entire industries that no longer exist.
Who still cares about the illegal bicycle coaster brake trust of 1913? Yet that decree
and others like it remain in effect. Old decrees can be rendered obsolete not only by
market changes but by changes in the law. So many old decrees will go out with a
whimper, if that.
But two particular consent decrees, if slated for termination, would likely result in a
multi-front war. Congress has already weighed in, cautioning the DOJ to not
terminate these two decrees without first notifying it.5 So what two consent decrees
still play such a fundamental role in today’s digital economy? The consent decrees
with American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (“ASCAP”) and
Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”).
The Division recently outlined its process. After identifying a candidate judgment for
termination, the Division will seek public comment on the proposed termination and, if
appropriate following review of comments, seek to terminate the judgment, typically by filing a
motion with the appropriate court. To eliminate the burden on defendants, courts, and the
Division of complying with, overseeing, and enforcing outdated judgments, the Division will
unilaterally seek to terminate legacy judgments, as appropriate. U.S. Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice’s Initiative to Seek Termination of Legacy Antitrust
Judgments, 83 FED. REG. 19837 (May 4, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1065011/download.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Delivers Keynote Address at American Bar
Association's Antitrust, Fall Forum, Washington, DC (November 16, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-deliverskeynote-address-american-bar.
5 Victoria Graham, Music Industry Eyeing Antitrust Cop’s Next Move in Licensing, BLOOMBERG
BNA (June 13, 2018), https://www.bna.com/music-industry-eyeing-n73014476476/.
1
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Although the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees were not among the first batch of
judgments that the DOJ reviewed for possible termination, both decrees are
regulatory in nature and old. Thus, they are potentially on the chopping block. The
head of the Antitrust Division, Makan Delrahim, recently sought to assuage this
concern somewhat.6 Nonetheless, the concern remains. ASCAP’s CEO, for example,
testified before Congress in 2015 that “regulatory oversight through outdated consent
decrees has failed to meet those changes in the marketplace, threatening the future
of collective licensing and depriving songwriters and composers of a competitive
return on their labor.”7
This paper addresses some of the likely challenges that the DOJ would face should it
seek to terminate the ASCAP and BMI decrees.
In Part I, we provide some background on ASCAP and BMI, the consent decrees, and
market structure. In Part II, we discuss how these two decrees have become an
important part of the legal scaffolding for licensing music over the past 70 years.
Given the important role the decrees have played in mitigating the antitrust risks
from ASCAP and BMI while promoting the efficiencies from collective licensing, Part
III examines the legal standard the federal court would likely apply in determining
whether to terminate the decrees. One problem is that if the ASCAP and BMI consent
decrees were terminated, the duopoly would remain, and licensees and consumers
would bear the risk of unduly restrictive anticompetitive practices. A second problem
is the difficulties the DOJ would likely face in convincing the court that terminating
Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Delivers Remarks at the National Music
Publishers Association Annual Meeting (June 13, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-deliversremarks-national-music-publishers [hereinafter AAG June 13th Speech] (“To be clear, the
Antitrust Division has not reached any conclusion about whether the ASCAP and BMI decrees
strike the best balance among competition, innovation, and regulation. Congress, moreover, is
also paying proper attention to the industry. It is taking a hard look at the Music Modernization
Act, and we look forward to seeing that legislation enacted and the results of those changes,
which have involved several years of process and input from various interested parties.”).
7 Written Statement of Elizabeth Matthews, Chief Executive Officer, American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers on Performance Rights Organization Consent Decrees,
Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Competition Policy and Consumer Rights (March 10, 2015),
https://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf/press/beth-mathews-written-testimony-for-senatejudiciary-committee.pdf [hereinafter Matthews Testimony].
6
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the decrees would benefit the public, given that it reached the opposite conclusion a
couple of years ago. Moreover, the concerns the DOJ heard during its review process
from licensees, such as Netflix, Pandora, and religious broadcasters, would undercut
the argument that the public would somehow benefit from the decrees’ termination.
Part IV examines the interplay between competition and regulation. One assumption
is that an antitrust agency’s mission to promote competition is in tension with
prescriptive government regulation. This is certainly true at times. But at other
times, particularly in markets with high transaction costs and dominant players,
regulation may be needed to promote competition. So this Part explores how
behavioral regulatory decrees, like ones in ASCAP, BMI, and other notable antitrust
cases, can actually promote, rather than undermine, competition.
If terminating the decrees will harm, rather than help, competition and consumers,
what are the alternatives? Part V offers three potential paths going forward.
I.

Background on ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees
a. Brief Background on ASCAP and BMI

ASCAP is “the oldest and largest performing rights organization [“PRO”] in the
United States.”8 Its 670,000 songwriters, composers, and music publishers own and
run the performing rights organization.9 ASCAP is also the “world leader in
performance royalties, advocacy and service for music creators.”10
ASCAP licenses over 11.5 million songs and scores to the businesses that play them,
then sends the money to its members as royalties.11 It uses “cutting edge technology
to track, match, process and pay on a trillion performances each year, making [it] one
of the most effective and innovative PROs in the world.”12 In 2015, ASCAP
represented “almost half of all composers and music publishers in the United

Id.
https://www.ascap.com/ (last visited July 26, 2018).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
8
9
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States.”13 As its CEO told Congress in 2015, ASCAP’s licenses involved over “500
billion performances made annually by over 700,000 different entities, making it the
most efficient PRO in the world.”14
ASCAP’s biggest rival is BMI. Founded in 1939, the non-profit performance rights
organization holds the public performance rights in over 10 million musical works.15
BMI likewise serves as an agent for songwriters and publishers, negotiating rates,
issuing licenses, and collecting fees. These original rights-holders—BMI’s
“affiliates”—grant BMI nonexclusive power to license performance rights to their
works. BMI in its 2017 fiscal year generated $1.130 billion in revenue, which set a
revenue record for the third consecutive year.16 BMI also became in 2017 the world’s
first performing rights organization to deliver over $1 billion to its songwriters,
composers and publishers.17
b. Brief Background on Market Structure
Every day, we probably hear music – whether in a restaurant or coffee shop, on the
radio, or at a bar or club.18 To publicly perform these musical works, businesses must
obtain permission from the copyright holders.19 The hundreds of thousands of music
users mainly rely on ASCAP, BMI, and two smaller performing rights organizations
to provide licenses to perform these works.20
In the United States, ASCAP and BMI are, by far, the largest performing rights
organizations and are responsible for licensing an overwhelming majority of works.21

Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 785 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir.
2015); see also Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers v. MobiTV, Inc., 681 F.3d 76, 78
(2d Cir. 2012).
14 Matthews Testimony, supra note 7.
15 For more on the background on ASCAP and BMI, see Peter C. DiCola & Matthew Sag, An
Information-Gathering Approach to Copyright Policy, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 173 (2012).
16 BMI’s Timeline Through History, https://www.bmi.com/about/history (last visited July 26,
2018).
17 Id.
18 Statement of the Department of Justice on the Closing of the Antitrust Division’s Review of
the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (August 4, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/882101/download [hereinafter DOJ Closing Statement].
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
13
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As the Second Circuit noted, “Together, ASCAP and BMI license the music
performance rights to most domestic copyrighted music in the United States.”22
A third performing rights organization, SESAC, has historically controlled a
significant, but much smaller, repertory.23 SESAC, as of mid-2018, licensed the
public performances of over 400,000 songs on behalf of its 30,000 affiliated
songwriters.24
In 2013, a fourth performing rights organization, Global Music Rights, entered the
market.25 Global Music Rights is an “invitation-only” entity with a “small but highprofile” client list; it controls a “considerably smaller” collection of songs than ASCAP
or BMI.26
Because songwriters can only be members of one performing rights organization,
ASCAP and BMI have frequently competed for songwriters.27 The performing rights
organizations, however, infrequently “compete with each other for licensees, as
services such as Pandora typically require a license from all three PROs to operate.”28
c. Brief Background on Collective Licensing
ASCAP and BMI, as well as the smaller performing rights organizations, license
music predominantly through “blanket licenses.”29 The performing rights
organization pools the copyrights held by their composer, songwriter, and publisher
members or affiliates and then collectively license those rights to music users.30 A
Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc., 683 F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 2012).
DOJ Closing Statement, supra note 18.
24 About SESAC, https://www.sesac.com/#/our-history (last visited July 26, 2018).
25 DOJ Closing Statement, supra note 18.
26 Global Music Rights, About Us, https://globalmusicrights.com/About#why-gmr (last visited
July 26, 2018); DOJ Closing Statement, supra note 18.
27 Comments of Pandora Media, Inc. in Response to the Department of Justice's Review of the
ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/08/27/307973.pdf [hereinafter Pandora
Comments] (“While music publishers almost always have catalogs in ASCAP and BMI (and
SESAC), the PROs typically do not ‘compete’ for publishers”).
28 Id.; see also Comments of Netflix, Inc. in Response to the Department of Justice's Review of
the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (August 6, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/08/20/307908.pdf.
29 United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 720 F. App’x 14, 15 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Broad. Music,
Inc. v. Prana Hosp., Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 184, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)).
30 DOJ Closing Statement, supra note 18.
22
23
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blanket license provides access to each organization’s entire repertory without regard
for what specific songs are used or how often the songs are played.31
The collective licensing that has emerged from the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees
offer numerous benefits. As ASCAP’s CEO told Congress in 2015:
ASCAP negotiates and administers a blanket license for the nondramatic public performance rights in its members’ works on a collective
basis, monitor music usage by and collect fees from licensees, and
distribute royalty payments to its members. A blanket license offered by
ASCAP would provide efficiencies for song writers, composers and
publishers who would otherwise struggle to individually license or
enforce the millions of performances of their works by thousands of
individual businesses that publicly perform music, and licensees, who
would otherwise find it impossible to clear efficiently the rights for their
performances if required to negotiate separately with each individual
copyright owner.32
Blanket licenses from BMI and ASCAP, as courts have noted, are sufficient to license
nearly every domestic copyrighted composition.33
But the blanket license is not synonymous with collective licensing. As the Supreme
Court stated, ASCAP “may not insist on the blanket license.”34 ASCAP and BMI,
under their consent decrees, must provide licensees a genuine economic choice.
Indeed, Justice Stevens, in his dissent in the BMI case, noted that the licensing
market could be more competitive with multiple options. He noted that after the use
of blanket licenses in the motion picture industry was discontinued, a competitive
market for “synch” rights arose.35 The “synchronization” right is the right to record
a copyrighted song in synchronization with a film or TV show, and is obtained
separately from the right to perform the music.

Id.
Matthews Testimony, supra note 7.
33 United States v. BMI, 720 F. App’x at 15 (citing BMI v. Prana Hosp., 158 F. Supp. 3d at 189).
34 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 11 (1979).
35 Id. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31
32
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d. Antitrust Risks of ASCAP and BMI
Collectively ASCAP and BMI have dominated for years the music licensing business,
and continue to do so. As the DOJ told the district court in 2016, “Because ASCAP is
a collection of competitors jointly selling at agreed prices and controls a collection of
musical works regarded to be essential to many music licensees, it has long raised
competitive concerns.”36
Among the antitrust concerns involving ASCAP and BMI are collusion, exclusionary
behavior, and monopoly pricing. The DOJ first investigated allegations of
anticompetitive conduct by ASCAP over 90 years ago.37 In separate complaints in
1941, the United States charged that the blanket license, which was then the only
license offered by ASCAP and BMI, was an illegal restraint of trade and that
arbitrary prices were being charged as the result of an illegal copyright pool.38
Notably, the United States did not seek to break up these performing rights
organizations. Instead it sought to enjoin ASCAP’s and BMI’s exclusive licensing
powers and to require them to offer a different form of licensing.39
The cases were settled by consent decrees that imposed tight restrictions on ASCAP’s
and BMI’s operations, including requiring that their blanket license be nonexclusive.40 As the Second Circuit noted in 2012, “[s]ettlement of these complaints
led to the entry of two separate, but largely similar, consent decrees that continue to
substantially control ASCAP and BMI’s licensing practices, and minimize the danger
of unreasonable activity caused by ASCAP and BMI’s market power.”41

Memorandum in Support of United States’ Unopposed Motion to Enter Proposed Settlement
Agreement and Order, United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, Case
1:41-cv-01395-DLC-MHD (S.D.N.Y. filed May 12, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/851446/download [hereinafter DOJ’s Unopposed Motion in
ASCAP].
37 BMI v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. at 11–12.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 BMI v. DMX, 683 F.3d at 36 (internal quotes omitted).
36
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The ASCAP and BMI decrees were subsequently modified.42 ASCAP’s consent decree
was last amended in 2001, while BMI’s was last amended in 1994.43 As the Supreme
Court noted, the decrees can evolve and be updated.44
At the request of ASCAP and BMI, the DOJ, in 2014, opened an inquiry into the
operation and effectiveness of the consent decrees.45 The DOJ “solicited two rounds
of public comments regarding the consent decrees and met with dozens of industry
stakeholders.”46 At the end of the process, “[a]fter carefully considering the
information obtained during its investigation,” the DOJ reiterated the benefits of the
decrees: “In the decades since the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees were entered,
industry participants have benefited from the ‘unplanned, rapid and indemnified
access’ to the vast repertories of songs that each PRO’s blanket licenses make
available.”47 Thus, the DOJ concluded that since “the industry has developed in the
context of, and in reliance on, these consent decrees . . . they therefore should remain
in place.”48
II.

The ASCAP And BMI Consent Decrees Are an Important Part of the
Legal Scaffolding for Licensing Music

As the Supreme Court observed in 1979, and remains true today, the decrees are “a
fact of economic and legal life in this industry.”49 The antitrust consent decrees
enable users and artists to reap the efficiencies from each organization’s collective

BMI v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. at 10–11 (1979) (noting that following complaints
relating to the television industry, successful private litigation against ASCAP by movie
theaters, and a Government challenge to ASCAP's arrangements with similar foreign
organizations, the 1941 decree was reopened and extensively amended in 1950).
43 Radio Music License Comm., Inc. v. SESAC Inc., No. 12-CV-5807, 2013 WL 12114098, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2013), report and recommendation adopted as modified, No. 12-CV-5807, 2014
WL 12617437 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2014).
44 BMI v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. at 13 (“But it cannot be ignored that the Federal
Executive and Judiciary have carefully scrutinized ASCAP and the challenged conduct, have
imposed restrictions on various of ASCAP’s practices, and, by the terms of the decree, stand
ready to provide further consideration, supervision, and perhaps invalidation of asserted
anticompetitive practices.”).
45 DOJ Closing Statement, supra note 18.
46 Id.
47 Id. (quoting BMI v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. at 20).
48 Id.
49 BMI v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. at 13.
42
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licensing, while reducing the anticompetitive risks from these two dominant
performing rights organizations.
Licensees typically cannot play ASCAP and BMI off of each other. Since together they
control over 90 percent of compositions, and each of them is so large as to be
considered essential, licensees generally need licenses from both PROs. Thus,
ASCAP and BMI, absent the decrees, could exercise significant market power.
The decrees, however, have several important safeguards. Under the decrees,
members may grant ASCAP and BMI only nonexclusive rights to license their works
for public performance.50 Members, therefore, retain the rights individually to license
public performances, along with the rights to license the use of their compositions for
other purposes.51
Users can obtain a blanket license upon request (the effective compulsory license
provisions). But neither ASCAP nor BMI can insist on the blanket license. They must
offer the applicant a genuine economic choice between a per-program license and the
more common blanket license.52
If a licensee cannot agree on a fee in its negotiations with either ASCAP or BMI
within 60 days, the applicant may apply to the District Court for a determination of
a reasonable fee, with ASCAP or BMI having the burden of proving reasonableness.53
Both the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees include a “rate court” mechanism under
which the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has
jurisdiction to determine reasonable license fees when the parties to a licensing
transaction are unable to reach agreement.54
Consequently, as the Florida Restaurant and Lodging Association commented to
DOJ, “while any system of delivery, especially over time, will require modifications,
the Consent Decrees under review have by and large provided several intertwined
industries, from the creator of the product to its delivery to the ultimate end-user, a
stable and predictable platform in which to conduct business.”55 In deciding to
Id. at 11–12.
Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 BMI v. DMX, 683 F.3d at 37.
55 Letter from Florida Restaurant and Lodging Association to U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust
Div., Lit. III Section, dated Aug. 1, 2014,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/09/04/307675.pdf.
50
51
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terminate these decrees, the DOJ and court would have to consider this economic
reality.
III.

Legal Standard for Terminating a Consent Decree

Today many antitrust consent decrees have a sunset provision, generally ten years,
whereupon, absent extension, they automatically terminate. Earlier consent decrees,
like the BMI and ASCAP decree, lack such a provision. So one key issue is the legal
standard to assess whether an antitrust consent decree should be terminated.
In seeking to terminate other decrees recently, the DOJ told the district court that
given “its jurisdiction and its authority, the Court may terminate each judgment for
any reason that justifies relief, including that the judgments no longer serve their
original purpose of protecting competition.”56 The DOJ also cited the following factors
as to why the decrees should be terminated:
•
•

•
•

•

their age suggested that they no longer protect competition,
all the terms of the judgment were satisfied (i.e., identifying one judgment
where defendants were required years ago to divest certain businesses shortly
after they merged),
defendants likely no longer exist (i.e., companies have gone out of business),
the terms of the judgment merely prohibit that which the antitrust laws
already prohibit (namely price fixing, customer allocations, or group boycotts
for which defendants who engage in this type of behavior face the possibility of
imprisonment, significant criminal fines, and treble damages in private followon litigation thereby making such antitrust violations unlikely to occur), or
changed market conditions likely have rendered specific judgments ineffectual
(in that these judgments concern products or markets that likely no longer
exist, no longer are substantial in size, or now face different competitive
forces).57

As there was no opposition to the terminations of these decrees, the district court may
grant the DOJ’s motion to terminate.
Memorandum in Support of the Motion of the United States to Terminate Legacy Antitrust
Judgments at 5-6, filed in United States v. American Amusement Ticket Manufacturers
Association, et al. (D.D.C. filed July 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1078981/download.
57 Id. at 5-6.
56
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But a different court would not necessarily apply the DOJ’s criteria in a contested
proceeding. In terminating the ASCAP and BMI decrees, the DOJ would need to go
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. That court would
likely apply the standard that the Second Circuit adopted in 1995 for terminating an
antitrust consent decree.
In United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., Eastman Kodak Co. sought to terminate two
antitrust consent decrees.58 The 1921 decree, which was entered after the district
court found that Kodak had monopolized the sale of cameras and photographic
supplies, imposed various restrictions on Kodak’s business practices, including
preventing Kodak from selling “private label” film.59 The 1954 decree prevented
Kodak from selling its film in a “bundle” with its photofinishing services.60 After a
nine-day evidentiary hearing, the district court granted Kodak’s motion to terminate
both decrees. The United States appealed.61
One disputed issue on appeal was the legal standard to terminate an antitrust
consent decree. In exercising its equitable discretion to terminate the 1921 and 1954
Decrees, the district court required Kodak to prove that: (1) it no longer possesses
market power over film and photofinishing, and therefore that the primary purposes
of the decrees—the elimination of monopoly and unduly restrictive practices—have
been achieved; and (2) termination of the consent decrees would benefit consumers.
The Second Circuit affirmed this standard.62
a. Whether BMI and ASCAP Still Possess Market Power Over Music
Licensing
The first issue under the Kodak standard is whether BMI and ASCAP still possess
market power over music licensing. If not, then the primary purposes of the decrees—
the elimination of monopoly and unduly restrictive practices—were achieved.
63 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 97. Private label film is marketed under a brand name other than Kodak’s, typically
that of a retail outlet.
60 Id.
61 Id. (concluding that, under the legal standards established by Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty.
Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992) and United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968),
the district court's resolution of these issues in Kodak's favor provided a proper basis for the
court's decision to terminate the consent decrees).
62 Id. at 102.
58
59
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ASCAP and BMI, however, still possess significant market power over music
licensing. The two smaller performing rights organizations license far fewer songs.
SESAC, as of mid-2018, for example, licensed the public performances of 400,000+
songs, which is miniscule compared to ASCAP’s 11.5 million songs and BMI’s 10+
million songs.
One potential check on ASCAP’s and BMI’s market power, the DOJ acknowledged, is
that the consent decrees allow the individual rights holders to the songs to directly
license with businesses and other users.63
First, this check comes from the protections afforded by the consent decrees, and not
the competitive pressure from rivals.
Second, the National Religious Broadcasters Music License Committee noted in its
comments to the DOJ how the music publishing industry is “highly concentrated” and
“three major publishers now control the vast majority of musical works.”64
Even if the decrees were terminated, and the rights holders could negotiate
independently, this still would be a weak check on ASCAP’s and BMI’s market power.
Negotiations can be time-consuming and costly. So BMI and ASCAP could factor
these transaction costs in determining how much to raise their license fees.
As the DOJ told the court in 2016, “Courts have long recognized that ASCAP
indisputably exercises market power.”65 Likewise, the Second Circuit noted in 2012,
Memorandum of the United States on Decree Construction Issues, filed in BMI v. DMX, 08
Civ. 216 (LLS) (S.D.N.Y. filed April 13, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/casedocument/memorandum-united-states-decree-construction-issues-relating-united-states-v
(“direct licensing between rights holders and users establishes the most effective market-based
constraint on BMI's pricing because it places an upper limit on the price that BMI can charge
for the blanket license. If the BMI collective charged more for a blanket license than users
would pay if they licensed directly, users would forego a blanket license from BMI.”).
64 Comments of the National Religious Broadcasters Music License Committee In re ASCAP
and BMI Consent Decree Review (August 6, 2014), at 2-3,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/08/14/307806.pdf [hereinafter National
Religious Broadcasters’ Comments].
65 Petition of the United States for an Order to Show Cause Why Respondent American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers Should Not Be Found in Civil Contempt, filed in United
States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, Supplemental to Case No. 41-1395
63
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because “of concerns that ASCAP’s size grants it monopoly power in the performancerights market, it is subject to a judicially-administered consent decree.”66 The Second
Circuit made the same finding for BMI.67 Others during the DOJ’s review of the
consent decree raised concern over ASCAP’s and BMI’s dominance.68 Netflix, for
example, told the DOJ how “the Consent Decrees remain vital to constrain the market
power of ASCAP and BMI.”69
The fact that ASCAP and BMI still dominate musical licensing does not represent a
failure of the consent decrees. The consent decrees never sought structural relief to
eliminate this duopoly. Instead, the aim was to allow ASCAP and BMI to exist in
order to obtain the significant efficiencies in having these organizations offer nonexclusive collective licensing, but to prevent unduly restrictive practices by the two
organizations. As the DOJ noted in 2015 when challenging ASCAP’s exclusive
dealing, the consent decree “imposes a number of restrictions on ASCAP designed to
prevent its anticompetitive exercise of market power.”70
Consequently, if the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees were eliminated, the duopoly
would remain, but there would be no viable check to deter either of them from
engaging in unduly restrictive practices. ASCAP and BMI, if unconstrained, would

(DLC) (S.D.N.Y. filed May 12, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/850926/download (citing In
re THP Capstar Acquisition Corp., 756 F. Supp. 2d 516, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
66 Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers v. MobiTV, Incorporation, 681 F.3d 76, 79 (2d
Cir. 2012); see also In re THP Capstar Acquisition Corp., 756 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (ASCAP
consent decree “is an antitrust consent decree providing a mechanism for the setting of
reasonable license fees in a unique market in which ASCAP indisputably exercises market
power”), aff'd sub nom. Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc., 683 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2012).
67 MobiTV, 681 F.3d at 88 (BMI “represents most of the remaining composers in the American
market” so it too “operates under a consent decree similar to ASCAP’s”).
68 National Religious Broadcasters’ Comments, supra note 64 (“The market for music
performance rights is not competitive and the Consent Decrees remain critical to restraining
anticompetitive behavior by ASCAP and BMI.”); Netflix Comments, supra note 28 (“The
extraordinary market power and leverage created by the aggregation of copyrights and blanket
licensing practices of ASCAP and BMI are beyond dispute by now.”).
69 Netflix Comments, supra note 28.
70 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Justice Department Settles Civil Contempt Claim
Against ASCAP for Entering Into 150 Exclusive Contracts with Songwriters and Music
Publishers (May 12, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-settles-civilcontempt-claim-against-ascap-entering-150-exclusive [hereinafter DOJ May 12th Press
Release].
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have the power and incentive to raise price above competitive levels.71 They would
also have the power and incentive to engage in other anticompetitive practices. For
example, they could refuse to license, or include anticompetitive terms in their
licenses. As the district court noted in one rate dispute case, “While ASCAP may be
unwilling to offer a blanket license with a carve-out for a direct licensing program,
the terms of [the consent decree], the decisions interpreting and applying [the consent
decree], and the record evidence from this trial each indicate that such a license is
appropriate and justified here.”72
As ASCAP and BMI continue to have market power, it is unlikely that the DOJ could
satisfy the first prong.
b. Whether Termination of the Consent Decrees Would Benefit Consumers
Even if one put aside the first prong, the United States would also have to show that
terminating the consent decrees would benefit consumers. Here the DOJ would likely
have a hard time convincing the court, given that it concluded only two years ago that
consumers have benefitted and continue to benefit from the existence of decrees.
Consumers benefit from the output of musical performance that is enabled by the
decrees.
Industry participants and consumer groups likely would raise serious concerns if the
DOJ unilaterally decided to terminate the decrees.73 As a Public Knowledge
participant told the DOJ in its April 26, 2018 Roundtable on Antitrust Consent
Decrees:
The issue is that in the absence of a consent decree and in the absence of
any kind of oversight, we have seen examples of anticompetitive behavior
that the PROs have engaged in. . . . But because of this tendency towards
collective negotiation and blanket licensing, which is fundamentally an
efficiency for all players involved really, it does raise certain behavioral
MobiTV, 681 F.3d at 82 (“rate-setting court must take into account the fact that ASCAP, as a
monopolist, exercises market-distorting power in negotiations for the use of its music”).
72 In re THP Capstar Acquisition Corp., 756 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
73 See, e.g., Pandora Comments, supra note 27 (noting that “while other decrees may be
outdated, these decrees are relevant and needed more than ever in light of increasing market
concentration in the music publishing industry”); National Religious Broadcasters’ Comments,
supra note 64 (“The only protection that users have against ASCAP’s and BMI’s monopoly
power is the protection provided by the Consent Decrees.”).
71
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incentives for these groups to collude or to boycott or to [attempt] things
like partial withdrawal where they said despite the fact that we were
required to treat all comers equally, we would like to be able to
discriminate based on technology. And so these kinds of things naturally
arise. And we’ve seen arise over and over and over again, including in,
frankly, SESAC, which is not subject to a consent decree. It has a
substantially smaller catalog portfolio than BMI and ASCAP, which I
believe had together over 90% of most of the works in circulation. But
we’ve seen SESAC do sort of similar— the highly legal term I guess would
be shenanigans regarding collusion with publishers.74
Generally, the decrees, in lowering transaction costs, have expanded output. But the
concern would be that an unregulated BMI and ASCAP could engage in
anticompetitive behavior that would leave businesses and music listeners worse off.
c. Antitrust Litigation Is Not a Surrogate for the Protections Afforded
Under the Consent Decrees
One potential rejoinder is that ASCAP and BMI would still be subject to the Sherman
Act. Thus, the fear of treble damages would deter them from acting badly. While the
threat of antitrust prosecution could chill particularly egregious anticompetitive
behavior, the threat of antitrust lawsuits could not effectively replace the protections
afforded in the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees.
First, the DOJ is powerless to challenge under the Sherman Act a monopoly charging
higher prices. Thus, ASCAP and BMI would no longer have to fear their supracompetitive pricing being challenged under the decrees’ Rate Courts. They could
charge, like some pharmaceuticals, monopoly prices, without fear of antitrust
liability.
Second, even for unduly restrictive practices prohibited by the Sherman Act, the time,
expense, and uncertainty in bringing an antitrust case under section 1 or 2 of the
Sherman Act would significantly diminish the deterrence value from any threatened

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Public Roundtable Discussion Series on Regulation &
Antitrust Law, Session Two: Antitrust Consent Decrees: Transcript Part One (April 26, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1067496/download.
74
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litigation.75 Some smaller bars and restaurants, for example, have noted that
disputing “a $500 or even $1,000 fee discrepancy” in the Rate Courts “can involve
significant legal and travel costs to a licensee, a fact that does not escape the PROs
as they determine rates.”76 Thus, if small establishments find it difficult to challenge
ASCAP’s or BMI’s fees, it is unlikely that they could undertake individually or
collectively a rule of reason case that would drag on for years, and cost of millions of
dollars with economic experts, discovery and litigation fees.
Third, further undermining the licensees’ incentive is the low odds in prevailing
under antitrust’s rule of reason standard. For example, an unconstrained BMI or
ASCAP could effectively refuse to deal and cripple a business.
The head of the Antitrust Division recently noted the enforcement gap between the
United States and Europe: “European competition law still imposes a ‘special duty’
on dominant market players, while we in the U.S. do not believe any such duty
exists.”77 This is a bit of an overstatement. Earlier courts interpreting the Sherman
Act imposed special duties on monopolies.78 But the Supreme Court has limited the
duty of a monopoly to deal with its rivals.79 Thus, an unregulated BMI and ASCAP
could refuse to license in ways that reduce competition and overall welfare. As the
District Court overseeing the consent decree noted, the consent decrees prevent this
anticompetitive scenario.80
See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1375 (2009).
76 Letter from American Beverage Licensees to the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., dated
Aug. 5, 2014, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/08/13/307662.pdf; see
also Letter from Florida Restaurant and Lodging Association, supra note 55.
77 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Good Times, Bad Times, Trust
Will Take Us Far: Competition Enforcement and the Relationship Between Washington and
Brussels (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makandelrahim-delivers-remarks-college-europe-brussels.
78 See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373 (1973) (monopoly’s
consistent refusals to wholesale or wheel power to its municipal customers constituted illegal
monopolization).
79 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004)
(noting that the duty to deal imposed in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585 (1985) was at or near the outer boundary of liability under § 2 of the Sherman Act).
80 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 13 CIV. 4037 LLS, 2013 WL 6697788, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013) (“BMI and the intervenors argue that nothing in the BMI Consent
Decree prevents BMI from agreeing not to serve particular customers. That puts matters
backwards. Nothing in the Consent Decree settling this antitrust case can be read to allow one
75
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An unconstrained ASCAP and BMI could also engage in anticompetitive exclusive
dealing, which would be harder for the DOJ to monitor and deter. Beginning in
approximately 2008, ASCAP inserted language into many loan side letters and
advance and guarantee agreements that ASCAP would be the exclusive licensor of
the members’ rights.81 All told, ASCAP entered into approximately 150 contracts
with songwriter and publisher members that made ASCAP the exclusive licensor of
their performance right.82 This exclusivity clearly violated the ASCAP consent
decree. As the DOJ told the court, the consent decree’s non-exclusivity provisions
“are at the heart of the relief” that the decree provides.83 In 2015, ASCAP settled,
promising, among other things, “not to enter into further exclusive contracts and
agreed to reform its licensing practices to remove music publishers from overseeing
ASCAP’s licensing.”84
Despite the clear provisions in a court order prohibiting ASCAP from interfering with
its members’ ability to directly license their songs, ASCAP, nonetheless, violated the
decree for seven years. If the consent decree did not deter this anticompetitive
behavior, it is hard to imagine how the threat of an antitrust suit, in a post-decree
world, would deter ASCAP and BMI. Especially when antitrust plaintiffs often lose
exclusive dealing cases.85
The DOJ, in bringing the civil contempt case against ASCAP and seeking a fine,
sought to send “an important message to ASCAP and others subject to antitrust
consent decrees that they must abide by the terms of the decrees or face significant
with BMI’s market power to refuse to deal with certain of its applicants. The copyright law
necessarily gives that privilege to the intervenors, but BMI cannot combine with them by
holding in its repertory compositions that come with an invitation to a boycott attached.”); see
also In re Pandora Media, Inc., No. 12 CIV. 8035 DLC, 2013 WL 5211927, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
17, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors & Publishers,
785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015) (ASCAP decree denies “ASCAP the power to refuse to grant public
performance rights to songs to particular users while, at the same time, retaining the songs in
question in its repertory”).
81 DOJ’s Unopposed Motion in ASCAP, supra note 36.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 DOJ May 12th Press Release, supra note 70.
85 See, e.g., Morales-Villalobos v. Garcia-Llorens, 316 F.3d 51, 55 (1st Cir. 2003) (“many of these
antitrust cases brought by excluded medical care providers are ultimately decided against
plaintiffs, usually after summary judgment or trial”).
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consequences.”86 With the decree gone, that deterrence would also likely disappear.
All that would remain would be a costly, time-consuming rule of reason case.
IV.

Anti-regulatory Arguments Are Inapplicable Here

But the issue here goes beyond whether or not the ASCAP and BMI decrees should
be terminated. The issue goes to the relationship between competition and regulation.
In a recent speech, Makan Delrahim said, “The core mission of the Antitrust Division
is to protect and preserve this kind of competition. At its most fundamental level, our
mission is in tension with prescriptive government regulation.”87
That is often the case with anti-competitive regulatory restraints that protect an
industry, at the expense of competition and consumers. One classic example involves
real estate.88 Some states significantly limit the ability of licensed real estate brokers
to compete. In this topsy-turvy regulatory world, buyers’ brokers, for example, get in
trouble for offering home buyers refunds on commissions. Here the tension between
antitrust and these anticompetitive state regulations is evident.
Regulations can limit economic growth. Weak antitrust enforcement also may limit
growth, because it tends to lock in the companies that are currently the winners and
make it hard for them to be toppled. So we understand the impetus toward less
regulation and strong antitrust enforcement – a view with sound historical roots.
However, in markets with significant transaction costs, as is the case here, some
degree of regulation may be needed. The economist Douglass North, in a speech
accepting the Nobel Prize, made this point:
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human
interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws,
constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and
self imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics.
Together they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically
economies. Institutions and the technology employed determine the
transaction and transformation costs that add up to the costs of
DOJ May 12th Press Release, supra note 70.
AAG June 13th Speech, supra note 6.
88 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Competition and Real Estate (last visited July 26, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-real-estate-0.
86
87
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production. It was Ronald Coase (1960) who made the crucial connection
between institutions, transaction costs, and neo-classical theory. The neoclassical result of efficient markets only obtains when it is costless to
transact. Only under the conditions of costless bargaining will the actors
reach the solution that maximizes aggregate income regardless of the
institutional arrangements. When it is costly to transact then institutions
matter.89
No one disputes that the transaction costs for policing IP rights and licensing would
be astronomical in the music industry absent collective licensing. Imagine if
thousands of users, if they wanted to use many, if not all, of the tens of millions of
compositions, had to identify and then negotiate with the tens of thousands of
copyright owners. Then add the costs in monitoring who was licensed to use the music
and who wasn’t. Everyone—listeners, businesses that license the music, and the
artists—would be worse off in this world.
Not surprisingly, Assistant Attorney General Delrahim recently praised the blanket
license as a “crucial innovation.”90 But the pro-competitive features of the blanket
license did not materialize out of ether. The pro-competitive benefits arose from a
critical regulatory institution, namely the courts and the DOJ in enforcing the
ASCAP and BMI consent decrees.
Here regulations, rather than undermining competition, provide the needed
scaffolding to ensure that we get the transformative benefits of collective licensing,
while mitigating the anticompetitive risks from this duopoly. Thus, given the high
transaction costs of music licensing and ASCAP’s and BMI’s ability to exercise
significant market power, legal institutions (like the BMI and ASCAP consent
decrees) matter. A regulatory framework is needed to yield the efficiencies from the
one-stop-shopping from the PROs, while curbing the abuses of market power.
And ASCAP and BMI are not unique. One early antitrust case provides another
example of how a regulatory decree can promote competition. In United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, all the railroads coming into St. Louis had three
competing options to cross the Mississippi River.91 However, Jay Gould and 14
Douglass C. North, Lecture to the Memory of Alfred Nobel, Economic Performance through
Time (December 9, 1993), https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economicsciences/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html.
90 AAG June 13th Speech, supra note 6.
91 224 U.S. 383, 391–94 (1912).
89
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railroad companies formed a joint venture to acquire the two bridges and Wiggins
Ferry Company, and thereby control access across the Mississippi River in St. Louis.
Moreover, the area’s topography and the cost of constructing and maintaining a
railroad bridge made it impracticable for every railroad desiring to enter or pass
through the city to have its own bridge. As a result, it was, as a practical matter,
impossible for any railroad company to pass through, or even enter St. Louis, without
using the joint venture’s facilities.
The government sought to break up the joint venture, which was perhaps justifiable
given that it purchased pre-existing bridges rather than building them. The Supreme
Court left open this option.92 But the Court chose a regulatory decree. The joint
venture had to admit members on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. And any
other railroad that did not want to become a member of the joint venture could still
use the terminal facilities upon such “just and reasonable” terms. And like ASCAP
and BMI, any disagreement over a fair and reasonable fee would be submitted to the
district court.
We see this same approach in the 1945 case, Associated Press v. United States.93 Like
ASCAP and BMI, the Associated Press had many members (over 1,200 newspapers
at that time). And the joint venture, like BMI and ASCAP, significantly lowered its
members’ costs. Associated Press lowered its members’ costs in reporting news.
Instead of each newspaper, for example, sending a sports reporter to cover the
University of Tennessee-Florida football game, each newspaper could republish the
story by the local Knoxville newspaper who was a member of AP. ASCAP and BMI
can lower its members’ costs in monitoring the use of their songs, and collecting
royalties.
Because the association itself offered significant pro-competitive efficiencies, the
United States did not seek to dismantle AP. Instead, the government sought a
regulatory decree to deter certain anticompetitive practices against rival newspapers,
with the court’s ability to modify the decree to prevent other discriminatory restraints
against non-member newspapers.
As these cases reflect, competition, in a world with high transaction costs, needs legal
institutions – whether they are laws, regulations, or regulatory consent decrees. This
92
93

Id. at 412–13.
326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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is especially true where one seeks to gain the pro-competitive benefits from dominant
companies, like a blanket license, while mitigating the anti-competitive risks that
these entities pose. So the choice isn’t whether the BMI and ASCAP decree should be
terminated. Rather, as the next Part discusses, what would be the optimal regulatory
framework?
V.

Paths Going Forward

As we have seen, simply terminating the BMI and ASCAP decrees is, by far, the worst
option. Licensees would be left with a duopoly with little, if any, protections. The
likely result would be supra-competitive prices, less output, and higher transaction
costs.
Nor is breaking up BMI and ASCAP a feasible or desirable option. The transaction
costs in licensing would likely increase. As the head of the ABA Antitrust Section
recently told the DOJ, “But in the absence of [Congressional] action, I think
continuation of those decrees, perhaps with some modifications, is essential, because
you certainly you don’t want to break up BMI and ASCAP. The efficiencies of two stop
shopping for broadcasters are really too great to provide.”94
Keeping BMI and ASCAP, but eliminating collective licensing, is not a feasible option
for similar reasons. A key benefit would disappear. As ASCAP’s CEO told Congress
in 2015, “If not for PRO collective licensing, the billions of performances made by
digital music services such as Pandora, Spotify and Apple’s iTunes Radio would
require clearance on a copyright-owner-by-copyright-owner basis – exactly the
problem faced by ASCAP’s founders years ago, but on a magnitude far greater.”95
Instead, there are at least three viable options to promote allocative efficiency, while
deterring monopolistic abuses:
a. Modification of Current Decrees
After its recent and extensive inquiry into the operation and effectiveness of the
ASCAP and BMI consent decrees, the DOJ was fairly positive about the decrees’
94
95

DOJ Public Roundtable Discussion Series on Regulation & Antitrust Law, supra note 74.
Matthews Testimony, supra note 7.
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effectiveness: “Although stakeholders on all sides have raised some concerns with
the status quo, the Division’s investigation confirmed that the current system has
well served music creators and music users for decades and should remain intact.”96
As the head of the ABA Antitrust Section recently told the DOJ, “There’s no
guarantee that you’re going to get a better public policy outcome from a new case than
by tweaking the decree, or better yet, as I’ve mentioned, getting a congressional
enactment. So in this particular case—I know we’ve focused on it to the exclusion of
pretty much everything else—I think this one sort of has its own glue.”97
No doubt the consent decrees are far from perfect. ASCAP in 2015, for example,
proposed a number of modifications to its consent decree, including (i) expediting the
rate-setting process (using arbitration rather than federal courts),98 (ii) licensing
multiple rights (namely permitting ASCAP to license mechanical, synchronization
and print rights in addition to public performance rights when requested to do so by
its members), and (iii) permitting limited grants of rights (permitting ASCAP to
accept partial grants of rights from copyright holders).99
As to the first point, a trade association of smaller bars and restaurants have
advocated arbitration.100 Other licensees, however, disagreed, pointing to the district
court’s expertise,101 and the informational asymmetries between the PROs and

DOJ Closing Statement, supra note 18.
DOJ Public Roundtable Discussion Series on Regulation & Antitrust Law, supra note 74.
98 Matthews Testimony, supra note 7.
99 Id.
100 American Beverage Licensees Letter, supra note 76; see also Letter from Florida Restaurant
and Lodging Association, supra note 55.
101 Public Comments Submitted to the United States by Fox News Network, LLC Concerning
Review of Antitrust Consent Decrees in the Above-Captioned Matters, filed in United States v.
Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors & Publishers et al., Civ. Action No. 41-1395 (S.D.N.Y. filed
August 6, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/08/13/307811.pdf
(“The existing rate court has developed extensive expertise in the field, and has provided
fairness, transparency and consistency to copyright owners and music users for many decades.
The rate court mechanism has thus benefitted competition and has served the public interest.
These benefits would be difficult or impossible to achieve under arbitration.”); Letter from
National Public Radio, Inc. to U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Lit. III Section, dated Aug. 6,
2014, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/08/13/307970.pdf; National
Religious Broadcasters’ Comments, supra note 64.
96
97
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licensees.102 Regardless, reducing the costs to resolve disputes appears to have
support from both the PROs and licensees.103
With respect to the second point, licensing multiple rights, this could potentially
lower transaction costs, thereby benefitting purchasers. ASCAP currently can license
the right of public performance, which is one of several exclusive rights provided to
copyright holders of musical compositions. But ASCAP cannot include in its blanket
license mechanical rights (the right to reproduce and distribute musical works as
phonorecords); synchronization rights (the right to use a recording of a musical work
in timed relation with visual images, for example as part of a motion picture or
television program); and print rights (the right to print or display a composition’s
lyrics).104 To obtain licenses for mechanical and synchronization rights, one typically
has to negotiate with the music publishers or their agents (such as the Harry Fox
Agency).105 As BMI and other PROs in theory can license these other rights, ASCAP
seeks to do so as well.
But as Netflix pointed out, “one of the additional rights which the PROs apparently
wish to be able to license - musical work synchronization rights - are currently
licensed in a far more price-competitive marketplace than the one that exists for the
licensing of composition performance rights.”106 So, Netflix questions permitting
ASCAP and BMI “to augment their ability to license in a marketplace that is
currently functioning in a price-competitive manner.”107
Moreover, Congress is currently considering under its proposed Music Modernization
Act to vest complete authority for mechanical licensing in one newly-created body.
So the PROs would be precluded from bundling performance and mechanical rights.

Netflix Comments, supra note 28.
Public Comments of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers Regarding
Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (August 6, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/08/14/307803.pdf (noting that “Rate
Court proceedings under the Consent Decree have become extremely time-consuming and laborintensive, costing the parties millions in litigation expenses”).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Netflix Comments, supra note 28.
107 Id.
102
103
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As to the third point, the DOJ recently lost to BMI on the issue of whether its consent
decree requires BMI to issue blanket licenses only on a “full-work” basis, or whether
they also allow the PROs to license songs on a “fractional” basis.”108 The DOJ
concluded that the consent decree required the PRO to offer only “full-work” licenses
because “only full-work licensing can yield the substantial procompetitive benefits
associated with blanket licenses.”109 BMI disagreed. Because the consent decree did
not prohibit fractional licensing, it was permitted.
The District Court overseeing BMI’s consent decree agreed with BMI. Judge Stanton
held that the “Consent Decree neither bars fractional licensing nor requires full-work
licensing.”110 The Second Circuit, in reviewing the district court’s interpretation of
the consent decree de novo, affirmed.111 The DOJ’s appeal began and ended with the
language of the consent decree. Because the decree is silent on fractional licensing,
BMI may (and perhaps must) offer them, as there was no evidence that a clear and
unambiguous command of the decree would thereby be violated.112
Assistant Attorney General Delrahim cited this loss as clearly demonstrating the
“challenge of regulating public performance rights through interpretations of
decades-old consent decrees.”113 But the loss stemmed from contract law, not
competition policy. If the inclusion of fractional licensing increases the risks of
anticompetitive behavior by ASCAP, BMI, or their members, then the Second Circuit
specifically left open the opportunity to fix it: the DOJ could move to amend the
decree or sue under the Sherman Act in a separate proceeding.114 Here again,
amending the decree is far easier than challenging the restraint under the rule of
reason standard.
b. Replace the Consent Decrees with a Legislative Regulatory Framework
If the DOJ no longer wants to enforce the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees, then an
effective regulatory framework must be in place to ensure that BMI and ASCAP can
United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 720 F. App'x 14, 18 (2d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 16.
110 United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 374, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
111 United States v. BMI, 720 F. App’x at 18.
112 Id. at 16–17.
113 AAG June 13th Speech, supra note 6.
114 United States v. BMI, 720 F. App’x at 18.
108
109
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deliver the efficiencies of their collective licensing, while preventing them from
engaging in monopolistic pricing or other anticompetitive behavior.
Congress could create the regulatory framework to replace the current role of the
DOJ and federal courts. DOJ alluded to this in 2016.115 This has several potential
benefits. A regulatory agency can be in a better position than an enforcement agency
to hold hearings, collect data, and propose and enact regulatory changes.
But it is questionable whether the federal government needs yet another
administrative agency, which raises its own costs and risks. Enforcing the ASCAP
and BMI decrees is not a full-time job for the Antitrust Division. Nor is it a full-time
job for the Media, Entertainment, and Professional Services Section within the
Division that oversees the decrees. So it is questionable whether the regulatory
framework warrants its own agency. Mission creep and regulatory capture could be
two unintended consequences.
Having an existing administrative agency enforce the decrees’ mandates could be an
option. But as the Internet radio service Pandora argued to the DOJ in its recent
review of the decrees,
these decrees are relevant and needed more than ever in light of
increasing market concentration in the music publishing industry. They
remain critical to constraining ASCAP’s and BMI’s overwhelming
market power and the Department’s continued involvement in this area
is necessary.116
The expertise in harnessing the duopoly’s pro-competitive efficiencies, while
minimizing the anticompetitive risks, exists within a competition agency. Otherwise,
the risk of anticompetitive regulations increases.

DOJ Closing Statement, supra note 18 (noting “the incongruity in the oversight over the
licensing of performance rights and other copyrights in compositions and sound recordings,”
believing “that the protections provided by the consent decrees could be addressed through a
legislative solution that brings performance rights licensing under a similar regulatory
umbrella as other rights,” and encouraging “the development of a comprehensive legislative
solution that ensures a competitive marketplace and obviates the need for continued Division
oversight of the PROs”).
116 Pandora Comments, supra note 27.
115
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c. Hybrid Approach: Consent Decree/Legislation
Rather than an “either or” approach, where one group (Congress/another regulatory
agency) or another group (the DOJ/courts) shoulder the weight in regulating ASCAP
and BMI, it might make sense to shift some weight to Congress to enact regulatory
reforms, while enabling DOJ to monitor the anticompetitive behavior it knows well,
such as exclusionary, anticompetitive practices.
Toward this end is the Music Modernization Act, which is making its way through
Congress. The House bill, for example, provides, among other things, for a Mechanical
Licensing Collective, which would grant blanket mechanical licenses for interactive
streaming or digital downloads of musical works.117
Some, including the DOJ, have advocated increasing transparency as to who owns
which rights for particular songs.118 The National Religious Broadcasters Music
License Committee noted in its recent comments to the DOJ of the “near-impossibility
of identifying the potential licensors of any particular performance right”:
Although the PROs offer on-line searches of their databases, they do not
provide a reliable or effective means of identifying the content of each
PRO’s repertory. . . . All of the search tools limit searches to one work at
a time, making searches for numerous works impractical.
As a result, it is effectively necessary for an entity engaging in substantial
numbers of public performances, such as a radio broadcaster or a service
making streamed performances, to obtain licenses from all three PROs.
The major publishers, of course, understand the anticompetitive effects
of the same behavior. Even where they seek to license their catalogs
directly, they strategically withhold information about their content.119

Overview of the Music Modernization Act,
https://lieu.house.gov/sites/lieu.house.gov/files/Overview%20of%20the%20Music%20Modernizati
on%20Act.pdf.
118 DOJ Closing Statement, supra note 18 (noting “the absence of a reliable source of data on
song ownership to which music users could turn to identify whether they possess rights to
perform a song or from whom they could seek a license”).
119 National Religious Broadcasters’ Comments, supra note 64, at 3.
117
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Currently some licensees obtain a blanket license from each PRO because they cannot
easily determine who owns what rights for which works.120 Thus, to lower search and
transaction costs, and increase the ability of licensees to negotiate directly with the
rights holders, it makes sense to have a searchable, updated database to help
licensees “more readily determine (i) who owns/controls the works they may wish to
license and (ii) what works (and sound recordings in which they are embedded) they
must avoid using to avoid infringement claims if they do not wish to accept the terms
offered by a publisher/writer whose works are not available through a PRO (e.g., after
a PRO ‘withdrawal’).”121
The proposed Music Modernization Act would provide a transparent and publicly
accessible database housing song ownership information for licensing mechanical
rights. As the report by the House Judiciary Committee noted:
The database that is required by this legislation will contain information
such as the title of a work, its copyright owner(s) and shares thereof,
contact information for the copyright owner(s), International Standard
Recordings Codes (ISRC) and International Standard Work Codes
(ISWC), relevant information for the sound recordings a work is
embodied in, and any other information that the Register of Copyrights
may prescribe by regulation.122
As the database contemplated in the proposed legislation appears to focus on data for
licensing mechanical rights, it might be helpful to also increase transparency in the
performance rights marketplace. Among other reasons, the Mechanical License
Collective is statutorily barred from negotiating and licensing public performance
rights and there will be no information about with which PROs a given work is
affiliated in the proposed Music Modernization Act database. While the proposed
Music Modernization Act database might present a potential model for improving
transparency for performance rights licensing, it will not, by itself, resolve all the
transparency issues.

Pandora Comments, supra note 27.
Id.; see also National Religious Broadcasters’ Comments, supra note 64.
122 H. Rept. 115-651 - Music Modernization Act, 115th Congress (2017-2018),
https://www.congress.gov/115/crpt/hrpt651/CRPT-115hrpt651.pdf.
120
121
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Moreover, under the bill’s “Wheel” Approach, a district judge in the Southern District
of New York would be randomly assigned from the wheel of district judges for rate
setting disputes. The “wheel” approach would enable BMI and ASCAP, as well as
licensees, to go before any judge in the Southern District of New York on a rotating
basis rather than being assigned to a single judge for the purpose of rate setting
disputes.123
Consequently, the proposed Music Modernization Act, including a transparent and
publicly accessible database housing song ownership information, can complement
the protections afforded under the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees. The proposed
legislation is not a substitute for the consent decrees as it does not address the
potential anti-competitive issues involving ASCAP and BMI, such as monopoly
pricing, exclusionary dealing, and discriminatory licensing. Instead, under this
hybrid approach, legislation in increasing transparency can help lower search and
transaction costs, and thereby along with the protections afforded in the ASCAP and
BMI consent decrees can help spur competition.
Conclusion
Sometimes it is good to shake things up a bit. Sometimes change is good. But it may
not be such a great idea to remove the legal scaffolding that supports an entire
industry. The decrees have proven their worth in providing the pro-competitive
efficiencies from ASCAP and BMI, while deterring some of the anticompetitive
harms.
So, while one can appreciate the DOJ’s desire to terminate obsolete decrees, it is
important not to sweep with too broad a brush. Congress is far along in the process
of creating a music licensing framework for the twenty-first century. The legislation
balances the interests of composers, musicians, streaming services and others, and
addresses long-standing disputes within the industry. Significantly, however,
Congress has decided not to create a new performance licensing regime. Rather, it
implicitly relies on the continuation of the ASCAP and BMI decrees and explicitly
directs DOJ to think long and hard before seeking to do away with them. As the late

Overview of the Music Modernization Act,
https://lieu.house.gov/sites/lieu.house.gov/files/Overview%20of%20the%20Music%20Modernizati
on%20Act.pdf.
123
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B.B. King sang “Never make your move too soon.” In clearing out old and obsolete
decrees, the DOJ should heed this advice.
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